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Abstract. Publishing individual specific microdata has serious privacy implica-
tions. The k-anonymity model has been proposed to prevent identity disclosure
from microdata, and the work on -diversity and t-closeness attempt to address
attribute disclosure. However, most current work only deal with publishing mi-
crodata with a single sensitive attribute (SA), whereas real life scenarios often
involve microdata with multiple SAs that may be multi-valued. This paper ex-
plores the issue of attribute disclosure in such scenarios. We propose a method
called CODIP (Complete Disjoint Projections) that outlines a general solution to
deal with the shortcomings in a naı¨ve approach. We also introduce two measures,
Association Loss Ratio and Information Exposure Ratio, to quantify data qual-
ity and privacy, respectively. We further propose a heuristic CODIP* for CODIP,
which obtains a good trade-off in data quality and privacy. Finally, initial experi-
ments show that CODIP* is practically useful on varying numbers of SAs.
1 Introduction
Individual specific microdata is essential for advancing empirical research, yet pub-
lishing such data can pose serious risks to individual privacy. To minimize the pri-
vacy risks, prior methods in k-anonymity [17,16] and its variants [21,6,11], -diversity
[18,13,14,23] and t-closeness [9,10] emphasized on reducing identity disclosure and
attribute disclosure [7]. While these efforts help protect individual privacy to a certain
degree, attribute disclosure can still occur if the microdata consist of multiple sensitive
attributes (SA). We highlight two shortcomings of the prior methods leading to attribute
disclosure in the presence of multiple SAs.
First, prior privacy protection methods is often insufficient when there are multiple
SAs, as it is difficult to ensure good diversity or strong closeness for every SA.
Example 1. Consider the raw microdata in Table 1(a). Suppose race and sex are quasi-
identifiers (QID) [17] and the rest are SAs. We consider all possible 2-anonymized
tables as shown in Table 1(b), (c) and (d). If we only want to publish a single SA, say
diagnosis, then we can publish either Table 1(c) or (d), as either table each has two
distinct diagnoses in every equivalence class (which is a set of tuples that have identical
values in QIDs [9]), E1 and E2. In addition, both tables satisfy 0.25-closeness [9].
However, if we want to publish all three SAs, each of the 2-anonymized tables has only
one distinct value for one of the SAs in some equivalence class (italicized in Table 1(b),
(c) and (d)). Consequently, each table only achieves 0.5-closeness for that attribute. 
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Table 1. Raw (a) and 2-anonymized tables (b)-(d). Ei are the equivalence classes after 2-
anonymization. Abbreviations used: HT (hypertension), DB (diabetes), AS (asthma).
(a) Raw microdata
race sex diagnosis family history job
t1 white f HT HT teacher
t2 white m HT DB lawyer
t3 white m DB HT farmer
t4 black m AS AS teacher
(b) Anonymized. E1 = {t1, t2}, E2 = {t3, t4}
race sex diagnosis family history job
white * HT HT teacher
white * HT DB lawyer
* m DB HT farmer
* m AS AS teacher
(c) Anonymized. E1 = {t1, t3}, E2 = {t2, t4}
race sex diagnosis family history job
white * HT HT teacher
white * DB HT farmer
* m HT DB lawyer
* m AS AS teacher
(d) Anonymized. E1 = {t1, t4}, E2 = {t2, t3}
race sex diagnosis family history job
* * HT HT teacher
* * AS AS teacher
white m HT DB lawyer
white m DB HT farmer
Second, when there are multiple SAs, a new type of attack named background-
join attack emerges. In this new attack, we assume the adversary has some external
background knowledge about some individual in the table. By joining the background
knowledge and the table, s/he can deduce sensitive information.
Example 2. Suppose Table 1(b) is published. Eve links Bob to equivalence class E2
based on his QIDs. In E2 each SA takes two distinct values. Thus, if Eve only focuses
on the SA of her interest, say diagnosis, she cannot infer whether Bob has asthma with
a probability more than 0.5. However, if Eve has background knowledge that Bob is a
teacher, she can deduce that Bob has asthma based on the natural join of “teacher” and
the last row of the table. 
Beyond the toy example in Table 1, in real life, microdata that involve multiple SAs
are also common. For instance, the dataset “Income Census (KDD)” [1] is extracted
from population surveys, which involves many SAs, such as employment status and
wage per hour. Publishing such microdata enables useful data mining applications such
as classification and association study among different SAs. However, as we have pre-
sented, prior methods have two shortcomings in dealing with multiple SAs.
Additionally, an SA can also be multi-valued as opposed to mono-valued. Given a
set of values S, a mono-valued attribute can take only a value v such that v ∈ S.
However, a multi-valued attribute can take any set of values S′ such that S′ ⊆ S.
Each value in S is atomic, i.e., there is no nested multi-values within a value. For in-
stance, diagnosis is multi-valued and can take a set of values, say {DB, HT, AS}. In the
dataset “Income Census (KDD)” [1], the attribute household status can be regarded as
multi-valued (see Sect. 7). In relational databases, multi-valued attributes are also com-
mon, although they are normalized and stored in a separate table. Since normalization
is a lossless process, normalized tables are thus no different from the original table with
multi-valued attributes from an adversary’s perspective.
In this paper, we explore privacy methods for publishing microdata with multiple
SAs, some of which may be multi-valued. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
1. We identified two drawbacks of prior methods on microdata with multiple SAs;
2. We derived a general framework CODIP to address these drawbacks, which can
also be applied on multi-valued SAs;
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3. We introduced two new measures Association Loss Ratio and Information Exposure
Ratio that quantify data quality and privacy in the new scenario;
4. We proposed a heuristic CODIP* for CODIP, which obtains a good trade-off in
data quality and privacy.
2 Related Work
Microdata are usually modelled as a table, where each row corresponds to a tuple for an
individual, and each column corresponds to an attribute. It is often assumed that each
tuple maps to one individual and no two tuples correspond to the same individual [20].
To prevent identity disclosure, Sweeney proposed k-anonymity [17,16], which intro-
duced the notion of quasi-identifiers (QIDs). The set of tuples that have identical values
in QIDs are defined as an equivalence class [9]. The requirement is each equivalence
class must contain at least k tuples. A few variants of k-anonymity also exist, e.g.,
Anatomy [21] which bucketizes sensitive values instead of QIDs, Micro-aggregation
[6,15] and Slicing [11]. While k-anonymity can prevent identity disclosure, it does not
prevent attribute disclosure.
Recent extensions of k-anonymity also address attribute disclosure. Their philosophy
is to make SA values in each equivalence class more diverse. Ref. [18] proposed p-
sensitivity, requiring an SA to take at least p distinct values in every equivalence class.
Furthermore, [14] pointed out that the distinct values must be “well represented”, and
proposed -diversity based on information entropy and attribute value frequency. In a
similar spirit as -diversity, (k, e)-anonymity [23] can be adopted on continuous values
such that each equivalence class must contain sensitive values of a range at least e.
However, according to [9,10], -diversity is unnecessary and difficult to achieve in
some cases, and is prone to skewness and similarity attacks. To address these limita-
tions, Li et al. [9] proposed t-closeness. The model requires that the distribution Dj
of the SA in each equivalence class Ej is close enough to the overall distribution D
in the entire table. Specifically, a table satisfies t-closeness if ∀Ej : dist(Dj , D) ≤ t,
where dist(X,X ′) is the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) between X and X ′. A strong
closeness (i.e., a small value of closeness) indicates that the distributions of the SA in
each equivalence class are similar to the overall distribution in the entire table, there-
fore implying less risk for attribute disclosure. Li et al. also introduced (n, t)-closeness
[10], an extension of the basic t-closeness, which allows more flexibility while retaining
closeness.
The above works only deal with a single mono-valued SA. They cannot cope with
multiple SAs, with the two drawbacks identified in Sect. 1. This paper extends exist-
ing models such as k-anonymity and t-closeness to the new scenario. Currently only
a limited number of works deal with multiple mono-valued SAs [12,22,4]. However,
they did not deal with the background-join attack (see Sect. 1), a major problem in
the presence of multiple SAs– simply because all these works publish the SAs in one
table, preserving associations among SAs. Hence an adversary can join the table with
his/her background knowledge to reveal other SAs. In addition, they did not address the
problem of multi-valued attributes, which we will explore in this paper.
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Notation Representation
A = {A1, . . . , As} the set of sensitive attributes (SA), s = |A|
Q = {Q1, . . . , Qq} the set of QIDs, q = |Q|
E = {E1, . . . , Ec} the set of equivalence classes, c = |E|
Di the distribution of Ai in the entire table
Dij the distribution of Ai in Ej
dist(X, X′) EMD between distributions X and X′
Fig. 1. Notations
3 CODIP: A General Solution
In this section, we first introduce a naı¨ve t-closeness approach, which is a straightfor-
ward adaptation of t-closeness in the presence of multiple mono- or multi-valued SAs.
Next, we identify the shortcomings in the naı¨ve approach, and propose a general so-
lution CODIP to tackle the shortcomings. Note that although our discussion is based
on t-closeness, our approaches also apply to other privacy models such as -diversity
and (n, t)-closeness in a similar fashion. For ease of discussion, we present a list of
notations in Fig. 1.
3.1 Naı¨ve t-Closeness Approach
Multiple mono-valued SAs. First consider only multiple mono-valued SAs. Given
a k-anonymized table T , suppose all SAs A1, . . . , As are mono-valued. If two SAs
have strong dependency, their joint distribution would be similar to that of a single SA.
In this case, we can simply consider the closeness of their distributions individually.
If the SAs have weak dependency, their joint values will be very diverse, especially
when the number of such SAs are large (the curse of dimensionality). In this case, it
is meaningless to require an equivalence class to be “well represented” in terms of the
joint values of the SAs.
As such, we define t-closeness of T based on individual SAs instead of their joint
distributions. Essentially, in the naı¨ve approach, in order for T to satisfy t-closeness,
every SA must satisfy t-closeness for a given k-anonymization.
Definition 1. A k-anonymized table T , whose SAs are all mono-valued, is said to sat-
isfy t-closeness iff ∀Ai∈A∀Ej∈E : dist(Dij , Di) ≤ t. 
Multi-valued SAs. Given a raw table with n tuples t1, . . . , tn, suppose there is a multi-
valued SA B. B can take a subset of values in S, i.e., ∀tu : tu.B ⊆ S, where S =
{v1, . . . , vm}. Without loss of generality, we assume the values in S are categorical,
since continuous values can be discretized. It is easy to transform B into multiple mono-
valued attributes.
Definition 2. ∀vi ∈ S, define a bit vector (bi1, bi2, . . . , bin), where each biu = 1 if vi ∈
tu.B, and biu = 0 otherwise. Attribute B is replaced with m mono-valued attributes
B1, . . . , Bm, such that ∀tu,Bi : tu.Bi = biu. We term this process bitmap transforma-
tion, and each Bi the derived attribute of B. 
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Informally, B is transformed into an m× n bitmap. Note that bitmap transformation is
lossless and thus does not compromise data quality. In addition, each derived attribute
is mono-valued. This allow us to adapt the naı¨ve t-closeness approach on a bitmap
transformed table as we have just discussed. We then treat the derived attributes no
different from the original mono-valued attributes.
Shortcomings. The naı¨ve approach is a direct adaptation of t-closeness, which suffers
the two shortcomings in Sect. 1. We claim that the two shortcomings generally become
more severe when there are more SAs.
In the context of t-closeness, the first shortcoming is that we generally have weaker
closeness (i.e., a larger value of closeness) when there are more SAs, owing to the effect
of diminishing closeness. This effect is formalized in Theorem. 1. Its proof is omitted
due to space constraint.
Theorem 1. Given a bitmap transformed table T , let T ′ be the projection of T on
A′ ∪ Q, where A′ ⊆ A. Let tbest and t′best denote the best closeness that at least one
k-anonymized T and T ′ can satisfy, respectively. The effect of diminishing closeness
states that tbest ≥ t′best.
The second shortcoming is that the threat of background-join attacks (abbreviated as
“join-threat” hereafter) becomes greater as the number of SAs increases. When there
are more SAs, an adversary can deduce new information on more SAs in a background-
join attack, which increases the join-threat.
Since we are enforcing t-closeness (or other models) on each SA, the threat of tra-
ditional background attack on an individual SA is similar to that in the scenario with a
single SA. We do not discuss this kind of attack as it has been addressed in previous
works involving a single SA. Instead, we focus on the new threat that arises due to the
existence of multiple SAs, the so-called “join-threat”.
3.2 CODIP: Overcoming the Shortcomings
If we can reduce the number of SAs in a published table, we can alleviate the effect of
diminishing closeness and the join-threat. Based on this, we propose a general solution
called Complete Disjoint Projections or CODIP. In essence, CODIP projects the raw
table on subsets of the SAs, and publishes the projected tables instead. Each projected
table has a smaller number of SAs than the raw table has. Additionally, all of the SAs
must be in exactly one of the projection. Formally, we call how CODIP projects the raw
table a projection plan, or simply a plan.
Definition 3. A projection plan projects a bitmap transformed table on its subsets of
attributes A1 ∪ Q, . . ., Ar ∪ Q, such that (i) ∪ru=1Au = A; (ii) ∀u : Au = ∅; (iii)
∀uw,u=w : Au ∩ Aw = ∅. We denote this plan Φ(A1, . . . ,Ar). The projections are
called the projected tables of the plan. A plan satisfies t-closeness iff every projected
table satisfies t-closeness as in Def. 1. 
To put in words, a projection plan isolates disjoint subsets of SAs in separate tables.
Each projected table is then subjected to various anonymity algorithms, and the order
of the tuples in each table is randomized. In this paper, we apply k-anonymity [17]
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and t-closeness [9]; however, we stress that CODIP is a flexible framework that may
adopt any previous privacy models on each projected table. The philosophy is to de-
vise a good projection plan (see Sect. 3.3) so that any algorithm intended for a single
SA (e.g., [21,6,13,10]) would also work well on each projected table without suffering
significantly from diminishing closeness and the join-threat, while at the same time pre-
serving most of the utility. The SAs of each individual within any projected table is thus
protected by such previous algorithms, which offers certain level of protection even in
the worst case. Linking SA values across tables is also limited, as will be shown in
Sect. 6.1. We will further discuss possible attacks in Sect. 6, which would not succeed
on CODIP.
Clearly, the naı¨ve t-closeness approach is a special plan (i.e., φ1 = Φ(A)). On the
other hand, φ2 = Φ({A1}, . . . , {As}) is also a special plan that publishes each SA in a
separate table. In this plan, the two shortcomings are completely eliminated, since each
table only contains a single SA. Note that all plans except φ1 suffer some information
loss. In particular, some of the associations among SA values are lost, as the correspon-
dence of tuples from different projected tables is disturbed. Such loss of associations
mitigates the shortcomings of the naı¨ve approach at the cost of data quality. Consider
φ2, in which the shortcomings of φ1 are completely eliminated. However, as each pro-
jected table only contains a single SA, all associations between any two SAs are lost,
making data much less useful. The goal is to overcome the shortcomings as well as to
minimize association loss, as we shall discuss next.
3.3 Choosing Better Plans
An optimal plan minimizes the effect of diminishing closeness, association loss, and
join-threat. We have made two observations towards such an optimal plan.
Observation 1. If two SAs have strong dependency, a background-join attack on them
reveals less new information beyond the adversary’s background knowledge on one
of the attribute. In addition, one of them can be closely represented by the other, effec-
tively resulting in fewer than two (independent) attributes. Thus the effect of diminishing
closeness on them is less pronounced. 
Observation 2. If two SAs are independent or with weak dependency, their joint dis-
tribution is insignificant, as no strong associations can be inferred from it. Thus associ-
ation loss is small if their joint distribution is lost. 
We use an example to illustrate the intuitions of the two observations.
Example 3. (Observation 1) Suppose diagnosis and family history are two SAs with
strong dependency. If they are published in the same table, Eve (who knows Bob has
hypertension), learns that Bob has a family history of hypertension by a background-
join attack. However, this privacy breach is less serious, as it is quite expected given
that Bob has hypertension. Moreover, since the distributions of both attributes would be
similar due to their dependency, the effect of diminishing closeness is less pronounced.
(Observation 2) Suppose job and alcohol are two independent SAs. Their joint distri-
bution appears random– people have different drinking habits regardless of their jobs.
The associations between the two provide little information beyond random guessing.
Thus, we can afford to lose such associations by publishing them in different tables. 
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Algorithm CODIP (T, k, t, α, β)
Input: T , a raw table containing microdata.
k, anonymity requirement.
t, closeness requirement.
α, threshold on association loss.
β, threshold on join-threat.
Output: φ, a projection plan.
P , the set of projected tables for φ.
1) Apply bitmap transformation on T ;
2) Partition A into r disjoint subsetsA1, . . . ,Ar ;
3) φ ← Φ(A1, . . . ,Ar);
4) P ← CheckPlan();
5) if P = null then
6) return failure;
else
7) return (φ, P );
Subroutine CheckPlan ()
Input: all variables accessible in CODIP.
Output: the set of projected tables for φ.
8) if association loss in φ > α then return null;
9) if join-threat in φ > β then return null;
10) for i ← 1 to r do
11) Ti ← projection of T onAi ∪ Q;
12) if no k-anonymized Ti satisfies t-closeness then
13) return null;
else
14) Ti ← a k-anonymized Ti satisfying t-closeness;
endfor
15) return {T1, T2, . . . , Tr};
Fig. 2. General framework for CODIP
To leverage the two observations, we propose a general framework for CODIP as shown
in Fig. 2– a high level abstraction assuming an ideal partitioning of SAs (a concrete
algorithm is proposed in Sect. 5). It requires the following user inputs: (i) T , the raw
microdata table to be published; (ii) k, the anonymity requirement; (iii) t, the closeness
requirement; (iv) α, the association loss threshold; (v) β, the join-threat threshold.
For inputs (iv) and (v), we delay the discussion of measuring association loss and
join-threat to Sect. 4. For now, assume that they can be quantified. Also, assume that
users can specify appropriate values for α and β, following the discussion on their
relationships in the experiments (Sect. 7.1), although a more extensive study on this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
The key operation lies in Step 2, which partitionsA into disjoint subsets. Ideally, the
partitioning should be consistent with Observation 1 and 2. In reality it only needs to be
consistent to such a degree that a “sufficiently good” plan is obtained, which satisfies
user specified thresholds t, α and β. Step 4 invokes the subroutine CheckPlan(),
which examines if the plan satisfies the thresholds. If so, it returns a set of k-anonymized
projected tables; otherwise, it fails. Note that users can optionally impose a quality
threshold on QIDs in k-anonymization (Step 12 and 14), e.g., discernibility metric [2].
In this general framework, we do not enforce any specific algorithm to achieve a
“sufficiently good” partitioning. A brute force method that enumerates all possible ways
of partitioning and then selects one is infeasible since the number of possible ways to
partition a set is intractable. We will propose an efficient heuristic CODIP* in Sect. 5
without requiring the costly enumeration.
4 Evaluating Projection Plans
In addition to k-anonymity that measures anonymity and t-closeness that measures
closeness, we propose two more measures on a projection plan for CODIP: (1) As-
sociation Loss Ratio (Γα), the degree of association loss due to the lost joint distribu-
tions of the SAs; and (2) Information Exposure Ratio (Γβ), the level of join-threat due
to background-join attacks. The measures are based on mutual information (MI) [5],
which can quantify nonlinear dependency between attributes, as opposed to correlation
which only measures linear relationships. It means MI can detect dependency caused
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by not only positive or negative correlations, but also “mixed” correlations. Hence, it is
well-suited for formally capturing the notion of dependency in Observations 1 and 2.
4.1 Association Loss Ratio
We propose a measure to quantify association when SAs are projected onto different
tables. Given a bitmap transformed table, for a pair of SAs Ai and Aj , their MI is
I(Ai, Aj) =
∑
v∈Ai,v′∈Aj p(v, v
′) log
(
p(v,v′)
p(v)p(v′)
)
[5], where p(x) is the pmf of at-
tribute X , and p(x, y) is the joint pmf of X and Y .1 MI quantifies how much informa-
tion two attributes share, which also implies the degree of independence between them.
In particular I(Ai, Aj) = 0 if Ai and Aj are independent. We can use it to quantify
how significant the association between the values of Ai and Aj are (Observation 2).
Lower MI suggests a higher degree of independence, and thus the association between
their values is less significant. This further implies that association loss is smaller if the
joint distribution of the two attributes becomes unknown.
By computing the fraction of MI of all pairwise SAs whose joint distributions are
unknown, we obtain a [0,1]-normalized measure of association loss– Association Loss
Ratio (Γα). Given a projection plan φ = Φ(A1, . . . ,Ar) such that ∪ru=1Au = A =
{A1, . . . , As}, the sum of all pairwise MI is IΣ(φ) = 12
∑
i,j =i I(Ai, Aj), and the sum
of unknown pairwise MI is Iα(φ) = 12
∑
i,j =i Wα(Ai, Aj)I(Ai, Aj), where
Wα(Ai, Aj) assigns a boolean weight— 1 if Ai, Aj are in different projected tables,
0 otherwise (i.e., I(Ai, Aj) is summed in Iα(φ) only if Ai, Aj are not projected onto
the same table). Association Loss Ratio is then defined as a fraction in terms of IΣ(φ)
and Iα(φ):
Γα(φ) =
{
Iα(φ)/IΣ(φ) if IΣ(φ) = 0;
0 otherwise. (1)
Note the special cases that Γα(Φ(A)) = 0, and Γα(Φ({A1}, . . . , {As})) = 1. In
general, Γα(φ) is smaller if the plan φ is generated in compliance with Observation 2.
4.2 Information Exposure Ratio
Next, we propose a measure of information exposure resulted from background-join
attacks to indicate the level of join-threat. Clearly, when more new information is ex-
posed, the threat level is higher. Thus, any background knowledge that is already known
to the adversary must be excluded.
Consider any pair of SAs Ai and Aj . Suppose their joint distribution is known to
an adversary, i.e., they are published in the same projected table. Assuming that the
adversary identifies a tuple and has background knowledge in one of them (say Ai),
s/he can then learn the value of the other SA (Aj). Potential new information of the
other SA (Aj) could be exposed to the adversary. The other two cases are trivial: (i) if
the adversary knows neither Ai nor Aj , no background-join attack can be launched on
them; (ii) if the adversary knows both, no new information will be exposed.
The amount of information expressed by an attribute Ai can be represented by its in-
formation theoretic entropy [5], which is defined as H(Ai) = −
∑
v∈Ai p(v) log(p(v)).
1 We avoid the notations pX(x) and pX,Y (x, y) for convenience if no ambiguity arises.
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The relationship of the entropies of Ai and Aj is illustrated by the Venn diagram in
Fig. 3. For any pair of SAs, if the adversary deduces the value of Ai (or Aj) based
on his or her background knowledge of Aj (or Ai), the amount of new information
exposed is h1 (or h2). Therefore, total amount of new information that can be exposed
from this pair is h1+h2. Since a larger h3 = I(Ai, Aj) results in a smaller h1+h2, less
information can be exposed to an adversary when Ai and Aj have more dependency.
H(Ai) H(Aj)h1 h3 h2
h1 = H(Ai)− h3
h2 = H(Aj)− h3
h3 = I(Ai, Aj)
Fig. 3. Relationship of Ai and Aj’s entropies
Also, some values in a SA could be non-sensitive depending on the user (e.g., nil
value). Hence users should be allowed to define what constitute sensitive values in a
SA. Let Sens(x) denotes the predicate that asserts x is a sensitive value. By default,
Sens(x) is true for all values in a SA; however, users have the flexibility to customize
it.
Subsequently we derive E(Ai, Aj), the total amount of new sensitive information
that is exposable in a pair of SAs Ai and Aj . Taking the sensitivity of values into
account, it is computed by summing up exposable information for each joint value,
weighted by the joint probability:
E(Ai, Aj) =
∑
v∈Ai,v′∈Aj
p(v, v′)×
{
0 ¬ Sens(v) ∧ ¬ Sens(v′);
H(Ai)− I(Ai, Aj) Sens(v) ∧ ¬ Sens(v′);
H(Aj) − I(Ai, Aj) ¬ Sens(v) ∧ Sens(v′);
H(Aj) + H(Aj)− 2I(Ai, Aj) Sens(v) ∧ Sens(v′).
Since a background-join attack is confined within the projected tables that contain
the attributes on which the adversary has background knowledge, we compute the
fraction of exposable information for each projected table. Given a projection plan
φ = Φ(A1, . . . ,Ar) such that ∪ru=1Au = A = {A1, . . . , As}, the sum of expos-
able information in all pairwise SAs (i.e., assuming there is only one projected ta-
ble) is EΣ(φ) = 12
∑
i,j =i E(Ai, Aj), and the sum of actual exposed information in
all pairwise SAs in the projected table on Au ∪ Q can be computed as Eβ(Au) =
1
2
∑
i,j =i Wβ(Ai, Aj ,Au)E(Ai, Aj), where Wβ(Ai, Aj ,Au) assigns a boolean
weight—1 if Ai ∈ Au and Aj ∈ Au, and 0 otherwise (i.e., only actual exposed in-
formation in the projected table on Au ∪ Q is summed). Information Exposure Ratio
(Γβ) is then defined as the sum of fractions in terms of Eβ(Au) and EΣ(φ) for each
projected table, normalized by the number of SAs in that table:
Γβ(φ) =
{ ∑r
u=1
(
Eβ(Au)
EΣ(φ)
· |Au||A|
)
if EΣ(φ) = 0;
0 otherwise.
(2)
Note the special cases that Γβ(Φ({A1}, . . . , {As})) = 0, and Γβ(Φ(A)) = 1. In gen-
eral, Γβ(φ) is smaller if the plan φ is generated in compliance with Observation 1.
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Algorithm CODIP* (T, k, t, α, β)
Input/Output: same as CODIP.
1) Apply bitmap transformation on T ;
2) for i = 1 to s do Ai ← {Ai};
3) φ ← Φ(A1, . . . ,As);
4) P ← CheckPlan*();
5) if P = null then return failure;
6) repeat
7) (Au,Aw) ← argmaxu,w:u=w AvgI(Au ∪ Aw);
8) φ′ ← φ; /* temp. placeholder */
(Continued)
9) P ′ ← P ; /* temp. placeholder */
10) RemoveAu,Aw from φ;
11) Add Au ∪ Aw to φ;
12) P ← CheckPlan*();
13) until P = null;
14) if Γα(φ′) ≤ α then
15) return (φ′, P ′);
else
16) return failure;
Fig. 4. Outline of CODIP*
4.3 Evaluation of Plans
We use Association Loss Ratio and Information Exposure Ratio to evaluate the quality
of a projection plan for CODIP. Based on their definitions, smaller ratios indicate a
better plan. We propose to evaluate our plans against a baseline, the naı¨ve t-closeness
approach in Sect. 3.1, i.e., the plan Φ(A). By Theorem 1, Φ(A) has the weakest close-
ness among all plans. Furthermore, Γα(Φ(A)) = 0 and Γβ(Φ(A)) = 1. Given a plan
φ, suppose Γα(φ) = α, Γβ(φ) = β, φ satisfies t′-closeness and Φ(A) satisfies t-
closeness. We say φ has a (1− t′/t)×100% improvement in closeness, (1−β)×100%
reduced join-threat, while suffers α× 100% association loss, as compared to the naı¨ve
t-closeness approach.
5 CODIP*: A Heuristic for CODIP
In the CODIP framework proposed in Sect. 3.2, we have not described a suitable al-
gorithm for generating good plans. A brute force approach to enumerate all possible
plans is infeasible on high dimensional data. Thereby we propose a bottom-up greedy
heuristic CODIP*, outlined in Fig. 4.
We start bottom-up from the initial plan φ = Φ({A1}, . . . , {As}) (Steps 2–3). The
basic idea is to ignore Γα(φ) first, and merge the disjoint subsets of SAs in φ as much
as possible. In this way, we attempt to reduce Γα(φ) below its threshold while avoid
exceeding closeness and Γβ(φ) thresholds. The key operations lie in Steps 6–13, which
correspond to the partitioning operation in CODIP (Step 2 in Fig. 2). We greedily pick
two subsets of SAs Au and Aw from the plan φ, such that the average pairwise MI
in Au ∪ Aw (AvgI in Step 7) is maximized. We then merge the two subsets Au and
Aw in φ (Steps 10 and 11). Based on Observations 1 and 2, this merging would greatly
reduce Γα(φ), and result in a small increase in closeness and Γβ(φ) at least locally.
The merging process is repeated until the plan φ exceeds the thresholds on closeness or
Γβ(φ) (Step 6-13). The subroutine CheckPlan*() checks if φ satisfies the thresholds
on closeness and Γβ . It is identical to CheckPlan() in CODIP, except that it does not
check for Γα (i.e., eliminate Step 8 in Fig. 2), as it will be checked later. Subsequently,
the plan before the last merger is returned if it satisfies the threshold on Γα (Step 14–16).
CODIP* is efficient by avoiding the combinatorial enumeration of attributes. For a
dataset with s number of SAs, in the worst case, only s− 1 mergers are necessary (i.e.,
the number of repetitions of Step 6–13 is bounded by O(s)).
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6 Discussion of Possible Attacks on CODIP
6.1 Intersection Attack
Intersection attack occurs when multiple tables are intersected on common attributes
[19], potentially re-establishing the links among sensitive values and QIDs across ta-
bles. [19] proposed the notion of (X,Y )-linkability– the extent of “linking” between
X (QIDs) and Y (SAs). (X,Y )-linkability is satisfied if the confidence of inferring any
value on Y from any value on X (can be joint value on X or Y ) does not exceed a
threshold  ∈ (0, 1]. We show that releasing multiple tables using CODIP introduces
no more linking risk than releasing a single table using k-anonymity and distinct--
diversity, i.e., each equivalence class must contain at least  distinct values,  ≥ 2.
Theorem 2. The tables released by CODIP (each table protected by k-anonymity and
distinct--diversity) satisfies (X,Y )-linkability with a threshold the same as the case of
a single table released using k-anonymity and distinct--diversity.
Proof. As the subset of SAs (Y ) in each projected table is disjoint, only QIDs (X)
can be intersected. Consider a join of m tables by intersecting on some QIDs. By k-
anonymity there are at least k tuples in each table with the same QIDs, producing a
join with at least km tuples for any (joint) value on QIDs. Among the km or more joint
tuples, we examine how many have the same value on some SAs. By -diversity there
is at most k −  + 1 instances for any (joint) value on any SAs from one table. This
follows that there are at most km−p(k −  + 1)p instances for any (joint) value on SAs
from p tables (1 ≤ p ≤ m). Thus the confidence of infering SAs from QIDs is at
most k
m−p(k−+1)p
km = (
k−+1
k )
p ≤ k−+1k . The upperbound is the threshold, which
is independent of m. That means the same threshold is obtained when m = 1, i.e., a
single table using k-anonymity and distinct--diversity is released. 
Another type of intersection attack is targeted at incremental releases [3], where new
tuples for the same schema are included and re-released with old tuples. Sensitive values
can be intersected among old and new releases to derive hidden information. This type
of attack is inapplicable to CODIP for two reasons: (i) in each projected table, the tuples
all refer to the same set of individuals (i.e., no old and new tuples); (ii) given that there
are no common SAs across tables, intersection on sensitive values is not possible.
6.2 Minimality Attack
Minimality attack [20], is possible if the adversary knows the privacy algorithm. The
attack utilizes the concept of “minimality”, as most privacy algorithms attempt to min-
imize information loss in order to preserve utility.
For CODIP, minimality attack is possible on two levels. First, minimality attack
can target at each projected table, where k-anonymity is enforced. In this case, the m-
confidentiality model [20] can be applied on each projected table to counter minimality
attacks. Second, minimality attack can potentially target to restore the correspondence
of tuples in different tables. Fortunately, CODIP is not vulnerable to this. While CODIP
attempts to minimize the Information Loss Ratio Γα, its notion of minimization is rela-
tive to the MI of all pairwise attributes, and not to all possible correspondence of tuples
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from different tables. Even if an adversary has obtained a correspondence of tuples
with smallest possible Γα, this smallest Γα does not indicate a correct correspondence
of tuples.
7 Experiments
We performed some initial experiments to study the trade-off between data quality and
privacy. We choose the naı¨ve t-closeness approach in Sect. 3.1 as our baseline. Note
that the approaches in [12,22,4] publish all SAs in one table, thus they are vulnerable
to background-join attacks in the exact same way as the baseline. Therefore it is fair
to compare CODIP* with the baseline only, which suffers the same problem as these
previous work. Moreover, to achieve k-anonymity, we adopted a full-domain general-
ization scheme as outlined in Incognito [8].
The “Census-Income (KDD)” training dataset [1] is used. We chose four QIDs–
age, race, sex, citizenship, as well as SAs – seven categorical (worker class, education,
industry, employment status, business status, salary class, occupation), four numeric
discretized to {0, 1} (wage per hour, dividend, capital gain, capital loss), and one multi-
valued (household status, giving four derived attributes married, 18−, descendent, sub-
family). There are effectively a total of 15 SAs. Additionally, tuples with missing or
unknown values are discarded, giving a total of 98839 tuples that remain.
All algorithms were implemented in Java. The experiments were conducted on a
3.0GHz PC with 3GB memory.
7.1 Relationship of Γα and Γβ
Intuitively, given a plan φ, a larger Γα(φ) implies a smaller Γβ(φ). This experiment
studies the relationship between Association Loss Ratio and Information Exposure Ra-
tio. Since the two ratios only depend on the way the raw table is projected, k-anonymity
and t-closeness requirements does not affect them.
We run CODIP* with varying thresholds. Starting from β = 1, which is the threshold
on Γβ(φ), we gradually decrease it. For each β value, we record the smallest Γα(φ) that
has incurred. A plot of Γβ(φ) against Γα(φ) is presented in Fig. 5, where φ is the plan
generated by CODIP* given a threshold β.
In Fig. 5, when no association loss incurs, i.e., Γα(φ) = 0, the join-threat is max-
imum at Γβ(φ) = 1. However, if we slightly relax Γα(φ), we can trade for a signifi-
cant reduction in Γβ(φ). This is evident from a sharp decrease in Γβ(φ) from 1 to 0.15,
when Γα(φ) slowly increases from 0 to 0.19. However, to further reduce the join-threat,
a small decrease in Γβ(φ) would result in a drastic increase in Γα(φ), which is a less
desirable trade-off. Generally, we can get a good trade-off plan if we allow some asso-
ciation loss and join-threat, without attempting to eliminate either factor or impose an
extremely small threshold.
Next, we study the effects of the number of projected tables (N ) on the plans. We
evaluate the plans generated by CODIP* against our baseline, the naı¨ve t-closeness
approach (i.e., N = 1). Fig. 6 shows the results of our experiment.
As expected, when there are fewer projected tables in a plan, privacy is less protected
as shown by the lesser reduction in join-threat in Fig. 6. On the other hand, data quality
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improves as reflected in the decreasing association loss. This observation is consistent
with CODIP*. In CODIP*, every merging action results in one fewer table causing less
association loss while risking more join-threat. Note that as the number of projected
tables increases, reduction in join-threat increases in a decreasing rate, whereas associ-
ation loss increases in an increasing rate. Therefore, a good trade-off plan usually has a
smaller number of projected tables (e.g., less than 7 in this experiment), and there are
some association loss and join-threat that must be allowed (as we have just discussed
based on Fig. 5).
Lastly, to show the scalability of CODIP*, we vary the number of SAs (s). The
number of projected tables (N ) outputted by CODIP* is shown in Fig. 7. As s increases,
N also increases. However, the growth of N is minimal when s is large (s ≥ 9 in this
experiment). This result indicates that CODIP* is effective in protecting privacy while
producing a small number of projected tables, even if there are a large number of SAs.
The experiments verified the possibility of greatly enhancing privacy while slightly
sacrificing data quality, i.e., a good trade-off can be obtained in practice.
7.2 Closeness and Anonymity
Next, we study the closeness and anonymity requirements t and k, respectively. First,
consider k = 2. To ensure the quality of QIDs, we also impose a discernibility metric
[2] (dm, in unit of 109) threshold on QIDs, such that k-anonymized tables with dis-
cernibility metric larger than dm are not considered. Smaller dm implies higher quality
in QIDs, causing fewer number of valid anonymizations.
Following the analysis in Sect. 7.1, we set thresholds α = 0.2, β = 0.5. Starting
from β = 0.5, we gradually decrease it, and obtain 6 plans by CODIP*, each with
a varying number of projected tables (N ∈ [2, 7]). Fig. 8 shows the best closeness
achieved by the plans under different thresholds dm for N ∈ {2, 4, 6}, in addition
to the baseline (N = 1), and the special plan with each SA published in a separate
table (N = 15). Specifically, Fig. 8(a) depicts the absolute closeness each plan can
achieve at best, whereas Fig. 8(b) compares the plans with the baseline and presents the
improvement of each plan.
We observe that smaller N results in weaker closeness. In CODIP*, N becomes
smaller when more mergers take place, resulting in a non-decreasing number of SAs in
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each projected table. This result demonstrates the effect of diminishing closeness. Also
note that when dm is smaller, there are fewer valid anonymizations, resulting in weaker
closeness. Hence, the improvement in closeness w.r.t. to the naı¨ve t-closeness approach
is potentially more significant.
Finally, we study the effects of k on closeness. We count the number of plans that
can satisfy the various thresholds in Fig. 9. Fig. 9(a) presents our findings. Note that the
baseline can only satisfy 0.42-closeness when k ∈ {2, 5, 10, 20}, and 0.52-closeness
otherwise. When k ≤ 20, we have quite a number of plans that can satisfy the require-
ments on closeness. As expected, a stronger closeness (i.e., a smaller t) results in fewer
valid plans. However, when k becomes large (k ≥ 50), there is apparently no plan
that can satisfy the thresholds. The reason is that the number of valid k-anonymizations
drops as k increases. Fig. 9(b) shows the number of valid k-anonymizations, assuming
no requirement on closeness (i.e., t = 1). When k increases from 2 initially, the num-
ber of valid plans remains unaffected, as the k-anonymizations that are eliminated due
to increased k are expected to have weaker closeness– the eliminated anonymizations
contain at least an equivalence class whose cardinality is smaller than k, and smaller
equivalence classes are generally less “well represented.” When k continues to increase
beyond 20, the number of valid k-anonymizations becomes too few. It is likely that none
of these few satisfies the given closeness, which is indeed the case in this experiment.
Results showed that if k is not too large (e.g., k < 50), CODIP* generates plans that
satisfy stronger closeness, as compared to the baseline.
8 Conclusion
We studied the privacy issue of attribute disclosure in publishing microdata that have
multiple SAs, of some may be multi-valued. We introduced Association Loss Ratio
and Information Exposure Ratio to quantify data quality and privacy, respectively. We
showed that a direct adaptation of t-closeness is inadequate, and proposed a framework
CODIP and a heuristic CODIP*. Experiments showed that CODIP* generates good
trade-off plans on a real dataset.
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